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Moral Disengagement and Lawyers:
Codes, Ethics, Conscience, and Some Great Movies
MarianneM Jennings*
"The prosecution is not going to get him because I am. My
client is guilty and he deserves to go to jail."'
The quote is from the opening statement of lawyer Arthur
Kirkland, an ethically troubled soul, in the film And Justicefor All.
Kirkland/Pacino was not ethically troubled in the sense of
disciplinary rule ("DR") violations; 2 he was having trouble with the
notion of moral disengagement. 3 Pacino had fairly solid evidence
that the defendant he was representing in the case was indeed
guilty.4 But Pacino was pressured5 into representing a guilty and
* The author is Professor of Legal and Ethical Studies and Director of the Joan and
David Lincoln Center for Applied Ethics, at the College of Business, Arizona State University,
in Tempe, Arizona The author is grateful for the assistance of Martin Karpuk in the research
for this article.
1. Arthur Kirkland, Defense Attorney (Al Pacino), AND JUSTICE FOR ALL (Columbia
Pictures Corp. 1979).
2. Although part of the plot of the film does involve a state bar investigation of
Kirkland (with the State Bar represented by Christine Lahti, who switched drama careers
from lawyering to doctoring in the 90s in Chicago Hope). "Ethically troubled" is used here in
the moral sense, not the state bar sense. As well all know, the model rules and code of
Professional Responsibility (DRs) have absolutely nothing to do with ethics. See, Marianne
M. Jennings, The Model Rules and the Code of Profession Responsibility Have Absolutely
Nothing To Do With Ethics: The Wally Cleaver Propositionas an Alternative 1996 Wis. L
Rav. 1223 (1996).
3. Moral disengagement is defined infra note 12. It's a philosophical and intellectual
term that could perhaps lead a reader to believe he/she has encountered an intellectual
author. The author felt it best to allow the illusion to remain for at least eight footnotes.
4. "Solid evidence" is defined here to be his client confessing to him that he did rape
and beat the victim and, in fact, as the client explained to attorney Kirkland, would like to
do it again. Nothing like an honest, albeit brutal, client.
5. It seems that Pacino/Kirkland had disclosed another client's desire to commit
another crime, hence Christine Lahti and pressure from the State Bar to have Crackerjack
Kirkland represent the very bad judge. The film is loosey goosey with DRs but, in
Hollywood, Larry Flynt looks like Woody Hareison, too. Reality is, in many films, a victim.
See, e.g., Sally Field in NoRmA RAE (Twentieth Century Fox 1979), where she played a poor
Southern textile worker who unionized most of the South. The story is true, it's just that it
was hard to see Gidget and the flying nun in the struggle of the human condition. Also,
recalling her role with Burt Reynolds in Smokey and the Bandit (Universal Pictures 1977)
did not lend credibility.
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dangerous man. 6 During the course of the film, Pacino witnesses
lawyers representing the guilty a bit too zealously, lawyers missing
hearings, lawyers being entirely cavalier, and judges imprisoning
the innocent. 7 Finally, realizing he is unable to defend a guilty judge
in good conscience, Pacino snaps and tells the jury his client is
8

guilty.

What is perhaps most revealing about this opening statement/
Pacino scene in which a lawyer turns on a client is what happens
when the scene is shown to a room full of lawyers.9 There is
laughter, cheering, and a palpable sense of relief. In an odd
moment of cinematic catharsis, it is as if Hollywood captured the
secret desire of every lawyer's heart. 10
6. Who also happens to be a judge, who, supra note 4, confessed to a crime and the
desire to do it again. The cognitive dissonance for this guy must have buried the needle on
the moral disengagement meter. The meaning of this sentence will unfold, but a simple
translation: how does an actively pummeling judge remain on the bench sentencing other
pummelers?
7. Largely because of cavalier lawyers.
8. The film is worth a Blockbuster Tuesday $1.50 rental. Jack Warden is a gun-toting
trial judge who can't quite take that final step for suicide, although he tries just before going
into court each day. John Forsythe, who, for you 70s' television trivia buffs was the voice of
Charlie in Charlie's Angels, is the perverse and guilty judge. And Craig T. Nelson is the
district attorney who uses terrific sports analogies in his opening statements, thus
foreshadowing his Coach role. The film also offers a unique courtroom occurrence of
applause for Nelson's opening statement. The author has no authority to cite indicating
applause for prosecutorial opening statements is unique, but, she did survey a couple of
lawyers whose uniform response was along the lines of, "Never going to happen in my
lifetime."
9. Actually, the scene was shown to a two rooms full of lawyers in June 1997 as part
of the Lincoln Center series, "Law, Ethics and Cinema," June 3, 10, 17 and 24, 1997, in
Phoenix and Tempe, Arizona.
10. Which is, apparently, to state publicly what they truly believe about their clients
and/or case. But, we are trained to the hilt on client privilege. Only Alan Dershowitz is
allowed to criticize clients, lawyers, Jerry Falwell, and, really, anyone he likes because, well,
he is Alan Dershowitz, defender of the truly guilty. Remember, Mr. Dershowitz is the author
of books such as CHuTzPAH (1979); THE BEST DEFENSE (1982), (which is described on the
cover as "The Courtroom Confrontations of America's Most Outspoken Lawyer of Last
Resort"); REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE (1997);
and SEXUAL MCCARTHYISM: CLINTON, STARR, AND THE EMERGING CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS (1998)
(hereinafter SEXUAL McCARTHYISM).
Mr. Dershowitz offered this insight on his standards for screening clients, "Once I decide
to take a case, I have only one agenda; I want to win. I will try, every fair and legal means,
to get my client off-without regard to the consequences." ALAN DERSHOWTZ, BEST DEFENSE,
XIV-XV (1982).
Also, Mr. Dershowitz on truth and trials:
A criminal trial is anything but a pure search for truth. When defense attorneys
represent guilty clients-as most do, most of the time - their responsibility is to try,
by all fair and ethical means, to prevent the truth about their client's guilt from
emerging. Failure to do so ... is malpractice.
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While lawyers have been trained with the notion of justice for
all, that notion mandates representation not just of the guilty but,
occasionally, 1 of the repugnant. In theory, that representation is
indeed noble and necessary for our system of justice to work. In
practice, such carte blanche representation requires a lawyer to
participate in moral disengagement. 2 Divorcing one's personal
convictions from the act of representation, which may involve
offense to those personal convictions, is a tall order. The ease with
which that order is assigned to advocates presupposes that moral
disengagement is possible and that it can be contained or easily,
turned off and on, thus keeping it within the parameters of
3
representation, or lawyering.1
Arthur Kirkland's snap and lawyers' reaction to it are hardly
commonplace. But moral disengagement still creates an ethical
ALAN DERSHOWmrz, REASONABLE DOUBTS: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND THE O.J. SIMPSON CASE,

166 (1996). Mr. Dershowitz is a truly disengaged lawyer. See infra note 12.
11. Actual numbers may vary depending upon the lawyer's career track, clients,
partners, said lawyer's own partnership status or desire for such, and work with Alan
Dershowitz.
12. "Moral disengagement" is a hifalutin psychological term for the process through
which individuals detach the moral standards of lawyering and the legal system from their
internalized moral control mechanisms when those moral standards are contradicted. See
ALBERT BANDURA,

SOCIAL FOUNDATIONS OF THOUGHT AND ACTION: A SOCIAL COGNITIVE THEORY

(1986); Albert Bandura et al., Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement in the Exercise of Moral
Agency, 71 J. OF PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 364 (1996). Translation: what I do at
work has absolutely nothing to do with my personal life. Please note, the author did begin
work on this piece prior to Clinton, Lewinsky and popular theories on compartmentalization.
Moral disengagement is also the explanation for more criticism of lawyers' role. Richard
Wasserstrom explains it as follows:
I examine two moral criticisms of lawyers which, if well-founded, are fundamental....
The first criticism centers around the lawyer's stance toward the world at large. The
accusation is that the lawyer-client relationship renders the lawyer at best
systematically amoral and at worst more than occasionally immoral in his or her
dealings with the rest of mankind. The second criticism focuses upon the relationship
between the lawyer and the client. Here the charge is that it is the lawyer-client
relationship which is morally objectionable because it is a relationship in which the
lawyer dominates and in which the lawyer typically, and perhaps inevitably, treats the
client in both an impersonal and a paternalistic fashion.
Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1
(1975).
13. This is also hifalutin language that translated says: It is especially hard to not have
your lawyer thinking cross over into your personal life. You won't necessarily file a brief
before deciding who takes out the garbage in your house, but you will find yourself behaving
like Jim Carey in Liar Liar (Universal Pictures 1997), in which Fletcher (Jim Carey) lies to
his son, his wife, his secretary, judges, receptionists, senior partners, and his own mother
because lying is his stock-in-trade for getting results from clients and slowly consumes all
aspects of his life.
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pressure cooker from which there is no release. 14 Yet, moral
disengagement is largely ignored in the literature on legal ethics
when it may well be the root cause of what the public perceives as
the decline of lawyer ethics, effective advocacy, and general lawyer
trustworthiness. 5 Moral disengagement, or its modem label of
compartmentalization, requires suppressing one's moral conviction
in the interest of preserving justice. 16 Such distinction is a noble
activity in the name of justice but still requires some form of
rationalization. 7 The activity of rationalization is treacherous
territory in business, professional, and personal lives, but it is
peculiarly dangerous for lawyers.18 Rationalization in ethical
14. At least no release like Arthur Kirkland if one expects to continue in criminal
defense work. Telling juries your client is guilty has been shown, via marketing studies, not
to be an effecitve promotional tool for recruiting criminal defendant clients.
15. Lawyers were ranked dead last (with the word "dead" carrying literal meaning) by
the public for honesty and integrity. JAMES PATrERSON AND PETER Kim, THE DAY AMERICA TOLD
THE TRUTH (1991). The public in Arizona alone has been treated to some fascinating glimpses
of lawyer charm. Last year, the State Bar permitted a convicted murderer to sit for the bar
exam. He did not pass, but he was then hired to teach at Arizona State University. Those
who can do, those who can't teach and those who murder can go on to law school and
perhaps a tenure-track teaching position. One can only imagine the lectures, "Now, class,
when I committed my murder, Miranda was the last thing on my mind. . . ." Then you have
the lovely Carmen Fischer, a criminal defense lawyer who truly believed her client's story
and even went so far as to use consultation time periods with her client to really delve into
her client's soul. Don Bivens, State Bar Expects Lawyers to Act Ethically, Professionally,
ARIz. REP., MAR. 22, 1999, B4. "DELVING

ITO THE SOUL" IS A HIFALUTIN TERM FOR CONJUGAL VISIT.

Jail House Rock is an Elvis song, but
the author digresses. Carmen Fischer's visits lasted some 4.5 hours with sheriff's deputies
standing around asking, "What can she possibly see in a convicted murderer?" And the sharp
retort was, "He could get tenure someday."
16. Although, the notion is not all that modem. The A.B.A. Canons of 1908, which
remained in effect until the 1970s, provided, "The client cannot be made the keeper of the
attorney's conscience." Code of Ethics Adopted by Alabama State Bar Association, 118 ALA.
REP xxiii, xxix (1899) as adopted by the A.B.A., Walter P. Armstrong, Jr., A Century of Legal
Ethics, 64 A.B.A. J. 1063 (1978).
17. Rationalization is how all great scams, frauds, Ponzi schemes, and third-rate
burglaries are committed. The language of rationalization can be, "if they're this dumb, they
deserve to lose the money." "Everybody does this." "No one is really hurt." "They can afford
the [outright fraud] [burglary] because they're wealthy." While some burglars/perpetrators are
philosophical Marxists committed to redistribution of wealth, most are committed only to
expanding the chain of wealth distribution to themselves; i.e., the buck stops here, although
not of its own volition, is also part of their motto.
18. Under the professional rules, lawyers are to make decisions that are based on their
impact on their client, not society. It's consequences for the client, not consequences for
society. See e.g., Stephen Eilman, Empathy and Approval, 43 HASTINGS LJ. 991 (1992) and
DAVID k BINDER, LAWYERS AS COUNSELORS: A CLIENT-CENTERED APPROACH (1991). Just the nature
of our rules opens the door for rationalization not available to the public at large, e.g. we
may know who did it but we get to withhold that information. So, it is not a terrific moral
leap to conclude, when deciding what to disclose in contract negotiations, that withholding
material information is no different from protecting a client's interest. And the path
CONJUGAL VISIT IS A HIFALUTIN TERM FOR JAIL HOUSE ROCK
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dilemmas is the beginning of ongoing moral lapses and ethical
breaches. 19 At the heart of ethics for lawyers is the issue of moral
disengagement and its potential impact on other aspects of an
advocate's personal and professional life. Once the decision to
disengage morally from one's professional life is made, the lapses
in conduct, as measured by any standard, follow easily.20 At the
continues from there to fraud. For more examples of the slope, see DOUGLAS E. RosENTHAI,
LAWYER AND CLIENT: WHO'S IN CHARGE (1974). In fact, some lawyers decide to join forces with
their clients. For example, a lawyer could assure a nervous client in negotiations for a major
deal, "This is the way the game is played; you take as much as you can get." Then the
lawyer pauses and says to the client, "In fact, could I have a piece of the action?" So long as
you're helping, you might as well join in, percentage-wise or in some tax advantageous way.
Thomas L Shaffer and Robert E. Cochran, Jr., phrase it this way:
Hired gun lawyers, like godfather lawyers, play a role, a role that controls their moral
choices. Lawyers who are controlled by morality other than their own are at moral
risk. Morality is a skill like other skills; it is something that we learn by doing. As we
address problems morally, we develop the capacity to deal morally with other
problems. If moral sensitivity has no place in lawyers' daily lives, they run the risk
that their moral sensitivity will atrophy. The ethic of vicarious conscience, of role, is
morally schizoid; at best, it divides people up, and at worst it gives them excuses for
immoral behavior. "Either the moral personality is entirely fragmented or
compartmentalized, or it is shrunk to fit the moral universe defined by the role."
LAWYERs, CLIENTS, AND MoRAL RESPONsimm 29 (1994), citing Roger C. Cramton, The
Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J. LEGAL EDUC. 247, 259-60 (1978). There
you have it, DRs induce schizophrenia. The author knew this from law school and the bar
exam but is relieved to know that the philosophers/psychiatrists have validated the bizarre
and unforgiving impact of the DRs.
19. Consider the following path of moral devolution as outlined by George Lefcoe, a
former member of the Los Angeles Planning Commission who left politics to enter the
honorable profession of murderers, teaching at a university, i.e., law school:
I really missed the cards from engineers I never met, the wine and cheese from
development companies I never heard of, and, especially, the honeybaked ham from
of all places, Forest Lawn (Cemetery), even though the company was never an
applicant before the commission when I was there.
But because I missed them I think it was a good idea that I resigned. I do not think
it is wise to stay in public office too long a time.
My first Christmas as commissioner-when I received the ham-I tried to return it
at once, though for the record, I did not, since no one at Forest Lawn seemed
authorized to accept hams, apparently not even for burial. My guess is that not one of
the many public servants who received the ham ever had tried to return it.
When I received another ham the next Christmas, I gave it to a worthy charity. The
next year, some worthy friends were having a party so I gave it to them. The next
year I had a party and we enjoyed the ham.
In the fifth year, about the tenth of December, I began wondering, where is my
ham?
"Notable & Quotable," WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 1998, A14.
20. It's like Sam Malone (of Cheers fame) said when he got stuck driving a Plymouth
Volare instead of his Corvette, "It's amazing how fast you can go and how many laws you
can break when you don't care." Once you drive a Volare, you don't care (words to live by).
Or, it's like a convicted robber once said about his 127 speeding tickets, "If you're going to
rob a 7-11 store, what difference does it make if you get a speeding ticket on the way out?"
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very center of the legal profession's code of ethics, the focus on
zealous representation and the duty to the client, is the key to the
enigma of moral lapses by so many of its members.
If there is one popular cinematic question posed repeatedly about
lawyers it is, "How can you represent the guilty masses yearning to
be free?" Oddly, the public has the same question and it is not
often the public wants the same questions answered cinematically
that Hollywood chooses to answer. 21 At the heart of the public's
concern about lawyers' ethics is the inevitable moral
disengagement lawyers face in honoring their profession's code of
ethics. The drama in moral disengagement is compelling, but
resolutions for lawyers troubled by the separation of personal
virtue from professional standards have been missing in discussions
22
and lacking in both candor and efficacy.
I. WHAT

THE

RULES

OBLIGATE US TO

Do

Professor Geoffrey Hazard gives three core values for the
profession that have dominated the many iterations of our code for
centuries: loyalty, confidentiality, and candor.23 Loyalty and
confidentiality have produced the rules on keeping clients' secrets
24
and acting as a fiduciary in the best interests of one's client.
21. How else could we explain the success of Titanic (Twentieth Century Pictures,
Lightstorm Entertainment, Paramount Pictures 1997)? We all knew the boat sunk, but
Hollywood insisted on an epic film, which, we should note, ran longer than the actual time it
took the real Titanic to sink.
22. For the most part, a lawyer who queries, "But what about moral disengagement?"
has pretty much received a pat answer for which CLE credit is available, "Deal with it."
Janice Orens, a lawyer, phrased it this way, "It's like being forced into a sex relationship you
didn't anticipate. It feels horrible to do something that you wouldn't do normally."
Diana Cartwright, another lawyer, said of her role as a lawyer, "I have to contradict myself
depending on what role I'm taking... it's sort of a professional prostitution."
These upbeat thoughts came from RAND JACK & DANA CROWLEY JACK, MORAL VISION AND
PROFESSIONAL DECISIONS: THE CHANGING VALUES OF WOMEN AND MEN LAWYERS, 112 (1989). It's
always lovely to think of one's profession in terms of white slavery and prostitution. For this
I learned the Rule Against Perpetuties?
23. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE LJ. 1239 (1991). It did
not escape the author that the primo expert on ethics in our field is named Hazard. No
wonder, see supra note 22.
24. "'Client interest' is a prominent notion in codified American legal ethics ...
Thomas L Shaffer, The Legal Profession's Against Vouching For Clients: Advocacy and 'The
Manner That Is The Man Himself,' 7 NOTRE DAME J. L ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 145, 175(1993).
Legal ethics .. . is concerned with 'the goodness of someone else.' I would say that
legal ethics is concerned with the limits on how far I can go as a lawyer in helping
that person and, therefore, with the limits of that person's rights. That is, when we
write and enforce rules of lawyers' ethics, we define clients' rights in fundamental
ways.
Monroe H. Freedman, Legal Ethics and the Suffering Client, 36 CATH U. L REv. 331 (1986).
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Candor is the value that produced the rules on honesty with courts;
i.e., candor toward the tribunal. 25 The problem with the three core
values for the profession is that they have several inherent and
conflicting moral dilemmas in and of themselves: Does being loyal
and preserving confidentiality mean being less than candid with the
court?26 And what if preserving confidences means that someone

will be hurt?27 And what if being loyal to one's client means
representing someone the lawyer believes to be lower than a
28
rattlesnake in a wagon rut?
The core values of the profession are all well and good but they
remain a professional code created and enforced in isolation from
personal ethics or even the traditional schools of thought on
ethics. 29 The lawyer's code of ethics is divorced from general
notions about ethics such as honesty, not giving false impressions,
fairness, and justice. The rules presuppose the ease with which the
value of confidentiality can supercede an individual's moral code of
being truthful.30 The values of professional ethics are not always
Translation: we have to look at the client's rights when we're lawyers, not the fact that they
done scammed three-fourths of Gallup, New Mexico's population on a uranium mine theme
restaurant investment.
25. Candor Toward the Tribunal is Rule 3.3 and is "Thou shalt not lie to the court."
Actually, it's more like, "Thou shalt not lie in a material way to the court." Actually, it's more
like, "Thou shalt not lie in a material way to the court, and who are we to define
materiality?"
26. That's less than materially candid.
27. That's materially hurt, not your run-of-the-mill heart break, Sherman Act violation,
or eminent domain. Tobacco, silicone-now you're talking material.
28. Or, as in the case of Arthur Kirkland, actually knows the client has reached wagon
rut levels. To be able to represent such a person, one must morally disengage. Either that or
receive a really big retainer. Western jargon always serves to lighten up discussions in legal
ethics. Because, start tossing around phrases such as "material candor," and, well, them's
fightin' words.
29. Traditional schools of thought on ethics include Aristotle, Kant, and Sister Mary
Katherine of St. Agnes grammar school who all believed and taught your hair caught on fire
if you lied, cheated or made faces behind someone's back. (The last is limited to sister Mary
Katherine. Kant never, at least the author could not locate it in the index to Kant, addressed
it.) Professor Thomas L. Shaffer has noted:
When we make ethical judgment about persons we generally use terms like good and
bad in the sense of virtuous or vicious. When speaking of acts or behavior, we
generally use terms like right or wrong in the sense of praiseworthy or
blameworthy. . . . The great classical writers considered that character was
fundamental. Consequently they stressed the importance of developing virtues, or
dispositions of character, such as courage, wisdom, temperance and the like. For
them rules about particular kinds of conduct were secondary and derivative. By
contrast, a legalistic approach to ethics begins with rules about particular kinds of
conduct and makes virtue secondary.
THOMAS SHAFFER, AMERICAN LEGAL EHIucs: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION Topics, 70 (1985).
30. The author would cite a bunch of ERs, DRs, ECs and AM/FMs here, but, really,
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easily reconciled with individual values and lawyers are not
permitted, once involved in representation, to voice 31personal values
as a reason for being released from representation.
II. WHAT DILEMMAS THE

RULES

AND VALUES

OF THE PROFESSION HAND US

Just undertaking representation requires some rationalization on
the part of the advocate, whether the client is Timothy McVeigh or
Philip Morris. 32 The theme of representing the guilty returns as the3
lawyer takes on a client who is unabashedly in a lot of trouble.
According to the work of Thomas Shaffer and Monroe Freedman,
the reconciliation of personal values with code-imposed duties
leaves the lawyer with three approaches:3
Moral Neutrality

The guilty and/or

Moral Judgment

repugnant client
Moral Right of Representation

A. The Role of Moral Judgment
Those who engage in the middle approach of moral judgment as
a means for resolving moral disengagement will not represent one
whose work, life, or conduct run contrary to their own individual
once we got through the bar exam and legal ethics class we all pretty much reduced our
ethics to loyalty, confidentiality and candor, or in a nutshell/Gilbert's version, "Client wins."
31. The release from representation would have to be based on logistical or technical
issues such as an uncooperative client or a conflict of interest or, as Mr. Pacino/Kirkland
teaches us, the lawyer could just withdraw by announcing the client's guilt during his
opening statement, in full view of the prosecutor, jury and an artist busily rendering. The
downside of this method of being released from the obligation of representation is
disbarment.
32. Representing tobacco companies was demonized during 1998 because independent
counsel Kenneth Starr was found by James Carville to have argued appellate cases on behalf
of tobacco firms, a fact which Mr. Carville said established conclusively that Judge Starr was
Satan in wingtips. Demonizing Starr, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19,1998, A12.
33. I.e., guilty, or perhaps at rattlesnake rut level, see supra note 28.
34. The model is adapted from the writings of Monroe Freedman. See MONROE 1.
FREEDMAN UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHIcs (1990) and THoMAs L SHAFFER, ON BEING A
CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER (1981).

The example of representation of the guilty is used here because (1) more movies have
defense lawyer themes, and (2) it's just easier. But, even the probate lawyer can have a
morally repugnant client-one who disinherits mercilessly. A real estate lawyer could have a
slum lord client who refuses to supply hot water, dismissing it as a luxury. An employment
lawyer could have a union buster client. A presidential lawyer could have Mr. Clinton.
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values. Lawyers in this middle category reflect the thoughts of
Gene Hackman when he played prosecutor Robert Caufield in the
film Narrow Margin.35 Mr. Caufield, when offered a bribe to turn
over a witness to some mob goons, explains that he remains a
prosecutor because, "I like my side of the courtroom. The pay is
not so good but the air's a lot cleaner. If I wanted to make money,
36
I'd have to represent you and I'd feel like I needed to shower."
35. Narrow Margin (1990) is a classic in-over-your head film in which Hackman plays
an assistant district attorney who has been relentless in his pursuit of organized crime figure,
Leo Watts. Ann Archer plays a woman who, unbeknownst to Leo, witnesses Watts killing her
lawyer blind date. Now that is a bad blind date. It is also probably the worst possible first
date if you liked the victim because, well, future dates now fall under the rare common law
defense of impossibility. On the other hand, there is always a bright side, even to murder on
a first date. If things were not going well, murder does eliminate that awkward refusal for a
second date. Following the murder, Archer flees to Canada, Hackman follows and the two,
on a train, must try to elude mob figures who have been assigned not to date them but to
kill them. Dating is not ruled out, however, under mob rules of engagement, if it provides a
murder opportunity.
36. Criminal defense lawyers take great offense at this line. But the lay audience
viewing the film breaks into laughter. Professor Freedman addresses the ethical issues in
presumed guilt as follows:
The first question is, "Who is the client?" That is, how do I view my client with
respect to my role as a lawyer? The second question is, "What is the concern of
lawyers' ethics?" Shaffer's answer to the first question is that the client is "this other
person, over whom I have power." His answer to the second question is that legal
ethics is "concern[ed] with the goodness of someone else," that is, the client. He adds
that the subject of legal ethics begins and ends with Socrates' question to the law
professors of Athens: "Pray, will you concern yourself with anything else than how we
citizens can be made as good as possible?" Even if one disagrees, as I do, with
Shaffer's answers, the process of finding one's own answers to his questions provides
considerable insight into one's perspective on legal ethics and how it affects one's
answers to particular issues.
My own answers to Shaffer's questions are surely affected by my having come to
legal ethics from litigation involving civil rights, civil liberties, and the representation
of indigent criminal defendants. Accordingly, although I agree that the concerns
Shaffer expresses are important to lawyers' ethics, my attitude toward my client has a
different emphasis. I identify the client not as "this other person, over whom I have
power" but as "this other person whom I have the power to help." Thus, my central
concern is not so much how I can make my client a better person but rather how far
I can ethically go--or how far I should be required to go-to achieve for my client full
and equal rights under law. Shaffer thinks of lawyers' ethics as rooted in moral
philosophy, while I think of lawyers' ethics as rooted in the Bill of Rights as
expressed in our constitutionalized adversary system. My view of lawyers' ethics is,
therefore, client-centered, emphasizing the lawyer's role in enhancing the client's
autonomy as a free person in a free society.
I also believe that the lawyer's autonomy must be respected. Except in the unusual
circumstances of a court appointment, the lawyer is unconstrained by ethical rules in
her choice of areas of practice, causes, and clients. I impress on my students,
therefore, that clients lie, cheat, and even kill out of pure greed. If you are not able to
deal with that fact of professional life, I caution them, you should not go into the
practice of corporate law. Contrary to Charles Fried and other commentators,
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In the reconciliation of personal values with professional
responsibility, the lawyer who uses the standard of moral judgment
must be comfortable with the client and the client's conduct before
37
undertaking representation.
B. The Moral Right of Representation
A second group of lawyers reconciles personal values with
differing client goals, values or levels of guilt by approaching
representation as a moral value in and of itself. These lawyers view
the right of representation as a fundamental human right. Their
view of themselves, as described by Richard Wasserstrom,38 is that
of amoral technician whose skills or knowledge are made available
to clients. Abe Fortas described this protector-of-rights role of
lawyers as follows:
Lawyers are agents .. . and they should neither criticize nor
tolerate criticism based upon the character of the client whom
however, I do not consider the lawyer's decision to represent a client or cause to be
morally neutral. Rather, a lawyer's choice of client or cause is a moral decision that
should be weighted as such by the lawyer and that the lawyer should be prepared to
justify to others.
Only after the lawyer has freely chosen to represent the client is the lawyer under
an ethical obligation to provide zealous representation of the client's interests as the
client sees them. Even then, the lawyer has limited but significant scope to avoid
involvement in conduct that he or she finds morally offensive. The lawyer should be
permitted to withdraw on moral grounds in three circumstances: (1) if the client
consents; or (2) if withdrawal can be accomplished without significant harm to the
client's interests; or (3) in a matter other than criminal litigation, if the lawyer
discovers that the client has knowingly induced the lawyer to take the case or to take
action on the client's behalf by material misrepresentations about the facts of the
case, and if withdrawal can be accomplished without direct divulgence of the client's
confidences.
Grounded in the fundamental values of the Bill of Rights, my analysis of lawyers'
ethics gives individual dignity a central place. I expressly reject moral neutrality and
nonaccountability; indeed, I believe that moral discourse between lawyer and client is
an essential aspect of the lawyer's role. I am therefore nonplussed to find my views
cited as a paradigm of moral neutrality, and to find myself accused of favoring zeal
and confidentiality as ends in themselves, of being cynical, and of ignoring the
concerns of justice.
Monroe H. Freedman, "EthicalEnds and Ethical Means," 12 J. LEGAL EDuc. 55 (1991).
37. Thus, we had the withdrawal of Timothy McVeigh's original attorney, Stephen
Jones, because he realized the bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City had
affected too many friends for him to be involved in the defense in the case. Initially, he
thought he could disengage, but the impact, so to speak, was too personal. His defense
lasted 31.5 days. Also, his client called him a liar, always a signal the relationship has
deteriorated. Criticizing Client, McVeigh Lawyer Asks to Withdraw, WASHINGTON POsr,
August 21, 1997, A9.
38. Richard Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals:Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum RS. 1
(1975).
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they represent or the cause that they prosecute or defend.
They cannot and should not accept responsibility for the
client's practices. Rapists, murderers, child abusers, General
Motors, cigarette manufacturers and stream polluters--are
entitled to a lawyer.39
Under this view, lawyers are agents, not judges, and they protect
the system, not clients. 40 In philosophy, Professor Shaffer has
39. Abe Fortas, Thurman Arnold and the Theater of the Law, 79 YALE L J. 988, 1002
(1970). Mr. Fortas makes an equal justice-for-all argument. However eloquent in reason,
lawyers have not uniformly embraced the universal right-to-a-defense. See e.g., Independent
Counsel Kenneth Starr, supra note 32. It did not escape the author that GM is ranked right
up there with rapists, murderers and child abusers. I could understand putting Kia in that
category, but GM?
40. There are two difficulties with this rationalization for moral disengagement. The
first is that this need for representation crosses all economic boundaries. If the
representation itself is truly a moral obligation, with no moral judgment on conduct, then
such representation should be available to all. In other words, if the right to representation
regardless of repugnancy (RRRR or R 4) is a moral act, then all those seeking representation
should be afforded representation. However, lawyers' need for compensation means that
clients enjoy the representation needed to preserve the system only to the extent that they
can pay. If representation is a role of amoral technician, then all deserve that assistance,
regardless of ability to pay. Perhaps the new mandatory pro bono rules are a testament to a
rededication to the amoral technician concept. Then again, maybe they're just salve for the
guilty conscience. Then again, they could be more rules for state bar staff to monitor,
enforce, audit and sally forth into higher budgets and more staff. It's a little known principal
of physics and biology the state bar staffs grow as a cubed function of new lawyer rules.
One new rule equals three new staff members plus another page in the bar journal.
Moral disengagement is not unique to lawyers or law. Business has it too. Andrew
Carnegie poured a ton of money into libraries and museums after busting a union. Michael
Novak notes,
Carnegie's widely propounded principle had always been not to act hastily, never to
hire other workers (scabs) to replace strikers, to wait, to listen to them, to reason
with them, to reach an acceptable accommodation no matter how long it took His
public view was that well-trained and motivated workers are difficult to replace; it is
easier to satisfy a skilled workforce through reasoned negotiation. All this he violated
at Homestead. He lived in denial about what he had done, only later confessing how
much he regretted it and how much it haunted him. He created an inner cover story
to hide his guilt from himself; the pathos is expressed in his Autobiography.
In Pittsburgh, Carnegie was widely blamed for his moral cowardice-fleeing to his
beloved Scotland before the event took place and, once there, publicly affecting to
have been incommunicado. But, of course, he learned of events sometimes within
hours, certainly the next day or so. Carnegie went to Scotland for months every year,
so this charge hardly bothered him. But he often said that he wished in retrospect
that he had stayed home and handled matters according to his stated principles. He
deceived himself into thinking that he would have done differently in person than his
subordinates did, conveniently masking (even from himself, perhaps) the orders he
had given them. He was certainly a moral coward in never owning up to his personal
responsibility, not even in private. He did express bitter regrets.
Months afterward, Carnegie went back to Pittsburgh, spoke before the townspeople
of Homestead, and in later writings magnified out of all proportion the support a few
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equated this view to the Aristotelian View. 4 1

C. The Morally Neutral
The third group of lawyers engage in a form of rationalization
with an Adam Smith, invisible hand ring to it.42 The decision maker
in any particular case will work through the advocates, the good,
the bad,4 those with character, those without character, and those
who show up pursuant to being awarded a contract pursuant to a
public defender bid. Under this view the lawyer not only makes no
judgments about the client's behavior," the lawyer justifies
workers expressed for him personally. He tried to make up in philanthropy for
Homestead for the wrong done, building a huge complex that housed a library,
auditorium, swimming pool, and gymnasium, and later leaving an endowment to
support additional pensions for his workers and for other families in need. Unlike
most of his other philanthropies, however, his gifts to Homestead, grand as they were,
carried the attic odor of atonement come too late. Still, it was atonement and to that
extent a veiled admission of guilt.
MIcHAEL NovAj, BusiNEss AS A CALLING (1996), at 61.
Lawyers represent public housing tenants after representing John Gotti. It's penance. Or
David Kendall represents William Jefferson Clinton after representing The National
Enquirer. The author realized the analogy has broken down: for during much of 1998,
Clinton was The National Enquirer.
41. For you non-philosophers, the Aristolelian View is a hifalutin term bandied about in
moral circles. Translated for those who know trees falling in woods make sounds: Virtue.
(Same as what Sister Mary Katherine taught. See supra note 29.) Aristotle was a guy who
felt there was right and wrong; i.e., not a moral relativist and definitely not amoral.
AwTOTLE, MAGNA MORALIA (George Stock trans., 1915). Aristotle was a demanding guy.
42. Adam Smith, for you non-economists out there, said that competition serves as an
invisible hand which regulates the market place. His theories and book, AN INQUIRY INTO THE
NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776), were developed through his
observations at a pin factory. Just an aside on economics in case the reader is ever on
Jeopardy. "I'll take the history of economic theory for $100, Alex."
43. The cinematic flavor of this piece tempts the author to add "ugly" here, but
discretion is the greater part of footnoting and valor. See THE GOOD, THE BAD AND THE UGLY
(Produzioni Europee Associati (Italy) 1966) (a Clint Eastwood spaghetti western that
launched Dirty Harry, a Clint Eastwood cop who called criminals punks-definitely not an
amoral technician guy).
44. The author wishes to raise the flag once again on moral disengagement:
Those who refuse to pass judgment on a client generally seem to assume that such
neutrality is value-free. But individuals cannot market their loyalty, avert their eyes to
the consequences, and pretend they have not made a normative decision. To decline
to take a moral stance is in itself a moral stance and requires justification as such.
Thus the critical question is not by what right do lawyers impose their views, but by
what right do they evade the responsibility of all individuals to evaluate the normative
implications of their acts? Alternatively, by what right do clients circumscribe
counsels' ethical duty?
Deborah L. Rhode, Ethical Perspectives on Legal Practice,37 STAN. L REv. 589, 623 (1985).
Moral schizophrenia comes to mind or minds, so to speak. "Either the moral personality is
entirely fragmented or compartmentalized, or it is shrunk to fit the moral universe defined
by the role." Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in ProfessionalEthics, 55 N.Y.U.L REv.
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eloquence, deftness of motion, 45 and other trial strategies as
appropriate advocacy because of the inherent wisdom within the
system and its ability to consider the needs of the community and
make a just determination. 46 The lawyer, therefore, need not be
concerned with right or wrong because a higher power, like an
47
invisible hand, metes justice.
There is some support in the professional rules for the position
of moral neutrality.48 For example, lawyers cannot vouch during the
course of a trial 49 and the rules reflect nearly two centuries of
63, 79 (1980).
45. Both in the paper motion, as in motion to dismiss as well, as in the courtroom
sashay. The western theme, supra note 28 continues.
46. This form of rationalization allows Johnnie Cochran (to paraphrase comedian Dana
Carvey) to stand before a jury, while facing a mountain of DNA evidence that shows that
only O.J. and a guy in Borneo, who has the alibi of coconut tree activities in a different
hemisphere at the time of the murder, could have committed the Goldman/Brown double
homicide and thunder with indignation, "Why are we even having a trial here?" (See Dana
Carvey's Comedy Central Special).
Mr. Cochran also successfully argued the case that Detective Mark Fuhrman stood on the
lawn of Mr. Simpson's home at 5:30 A.M. on the day following the murder and said to each
passing uniformed officer and suit-clad detective, "We're framing O.J.-are you in?"
Mr. Cochran then went on to bring into his conspiracy theory frame-up the LA county labs,
the FBI labs, forensic scientists, dispatchers, Kato, Marcia Clark, and the guy in Borneo who
halted his coconut-tree activities when his local sheriff stood at the bottom of his tree and
shouted, "They're framing O.J. in Brentwood, are you in?"
This form of rationalization also permitted one William Ginsburg, Monica Lewinsky's
blowhard and starstruck, albeit temporary, attorney, to offer this explanation, with a straight
face, as to why President Clinton spent so much time alone with an intern, "They were
colleagues." So, like, girlfriend, is that Saddam bogus or what? As if' If we were to sum up
the morally neutral lawyer, the philosophy is, "Ours is not to question B.S., ours is to create
it and let others sift through it." For additional B.S., see ANDREW MORTON, MONICA'S STORY
(1999), in which William Ginsburg is referred to as "A sober W.C. Fields," at 227. Also,
Ginsburg may not only have morally disengaged, he went on to defeat his own morality. His
claim of kissing Monica's "pulkes" when she was six days old ("Pulkes" for you Yiddish
novices are inner thighs. Please, this is a family-hour journal) was problematic because
Ginsburg did not meet Monica until she was twenty-one. Six days, twenty-one years, pick,
pick, pick. Besides, not meeting her until after she graduated from college was immaterial in
the "pulkes" story.
47. And judging from the previous examples (see supra note 45), the invisible hand
preferably lacks critical thinking skills.
48. For example, Rule 1.2(b) of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr (1995)
provides the following separation of lawyer views, lawyer representation, and client views,
"(b) A lawyer's representation of a client, including representation by appointment, does not
constitute an endorsement of the client's political, economic, social or moral views or
activities." Rule 1.2(b) thus protects David Kendall's representation of the National Enquirer
and Alan Dershowitz's representation of the guilty who measure 12 on the Richter scale.
Interestingly, Judge Kenneth Starr's representation of tobacco interests caused all manner of
moral outcry. The difficulty with the espousing the noble cause theory is that the noble
cause is apparently in the eye of the beholder.
49. There is no vouching in court (no spitting either, except maybe in Wyoming). Rule
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distinction between the lawyer as an advocate and the lawyer as
moral agent.5° Atticus Finch, in To Kill a Mockingbird,51 did not
say, "I believe Tom Robinson;" rather he said, "In the name of God,
3.4(e) of the ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995) governs vouching and
provides that a lawyer may not "assert personal knowledge of facts in issue except when
testifying as a witness, or state a personal opinion as to the justness of a cause, the
credibility of a witness, the culpability of a civil litigant or the guilt or innocence of an
accused."
It does not escape notice that if there is an invisible hand that sorts through advocacy
(i.e., B.S., see supra note 46 (although it has occurred to the author that several other
footnotes in this piece could be cited for general B.S. Footnote 46 is referenced here for a
specific form of B.S.), then why shouldn't an advocate vouch? Perhaps because the thought
of advocates vouching is too much to require when representation regardless of the client's
guilt is mandated. The nobility of representation itself, repulsive or not, must cut across all
strata. Lawyers attribute greater nobility to representing leukemia-ridden children and their
families as against W.R. Grace than in representing W.R. Grace. (See, e.g., JONATHAN HARR, A
CIVIL ACTION (1996) or see John Travolta in the film A CrivL ACTION (Touchstone Pictures
1999) as the lawyer for the children and families and Robert Duval as the lawyer for W.R.
Grace). Nobility is never associated with an Inc. Also, after either reading the book or seeing
the film, you will not drink water again. The author disclaims all liability for dehydration.
50. In fact, here's a quote from two centuries ago that establishes the distinction
between the lawyer as advocate and the lawyer as moral agent by describing a lawyer as
advocate as one who
in the discharge of his duty knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client. To save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other
persons, and amongst them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty
he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others.
2 Thal of Queen Caroline (Shackell and Arrowsmith, 1821). Loose translation: The protests
be damned, defend the turnip head.
However, there is a contra view:
Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken
as to make us think him credible. We believe good men more fully and more readily than
others: this is true generally whatever the question is, and absolutely true where exact
certainty is impossible and opinions are divided. . . It is not true, as some writers assume
in their treatises on rhetoric, that the personal goodness revealed by the speaker contributes
nothing to his power of persuasion. George Sharswood, An Essay on ProfessionalEthics, 32
REP. A-B.A.183 (1884). And so, you have a true disagreement: the lawyer's character matters in
the latter, is irrelevant in the former.
51. (Universal International Pictures, Pakula-Mulligan, Brentwood Productions 1962).
Based on Harper Lee's book, the film is the story of Atticus Finch, a Southern lawyer, who
represents Tom Robinson, a black man accused of raping a white woman. In the
tension-charged town and trial, Gregory Peck as Atticus offers a masterful performance as a
lawyer with a case but an unwilling jury (the novel was pre-O.J. Simpson-type juries,
Dershowtiz sleight-of-hand, and smoke and mirror defenses). Also, Robert Duval plays the
odd but helpful village idiot, Boo Radley, who ensures that Scout (daughter of Atticus)
escapes death. Scout is a name chosen for one of the three daughters of Bruce Willis and
Demi Moore (I'll take Famous Novel Celebrity Children Names for $100, Alex). Interestingly,
Gregory Peck (Atticus) then tells a lie to protect Duval from the flood of attention (pies,
cakes) that would be showered upon such a hero (one who rescues children with goofy
names from attack). Scout was wearing a ham costume at the time of said attack. Truly,
there are some odd moments in this story. But Robert Duval went on to represent W.R.
Grace (see supra note 49).
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do your duty."52 Vouching occurs in the first case, which sends a
message of personal conviction.5 In the second case, only the
Divine engages in vouching and Gregory Peck is not even an agent
of apparent authority in that case.
All three morality views provide lawyers with a process for
disengagement. It is only under the moral judgment approach that
the disengagement is physical. 54 Under moral neutrality and moral
representation, the lawyer disengages mentally.
Because lawyers wrote up a code of ethics and called it legal
ethics, they created tenets of lawyer behavior that permit, and
often mandate, mental moral disengagement without accompanying
physical disengagement. Then, they took the rules on moral
disengagement and called them ethics so that moral disengagement
became ethical. For those still following along syllogistically,55
lawyers created a code of ethics that makes it acceptable to
dismiss personal ethics for purpose of work. The implication in a
code of ethics is that there is some discussion of values, whether
religious, universal, or simply based on standards of fairness and
honesty.56 Within the rules themselves are several tips of the hats to
the importance of values other than honesty.57 The notion of ethics
52. The phrase does appear in the book as well. HARPER LEE, To KILL A MOCmNGBRD, at
205, (1960). Interestingly, Jem (Scout's older brother and an observer at the Tom Robinson
trial) believes Atticus said, "In the name, of God, believe him." Id. at 206. Jem didn't
understand vouching. Horton Foote won an Oscar for that sort of dialogue in his screenplay
(once again, offered just in case the reader is ever on Jeopardy): "I'll take screenplay writers
for $200, Alex."
53. The rule against vouching exists not necessarily to protect the lawyer who is
morally disengaged from a client's cause but also to eliminate the bright line in a lawyer's
defense of a client he really likes and believes in, and one he's not crazy about but is
court-appointed to handle and one for whom he is unwilling to do more than file a motion to
suppress or two. Such disparate treatment would surely catch attention of juries: "He's not
vouching for his client this time. His client must really be guilty." Hence, no vouching at all
so as to not make the distinction too obvious for juries. One can imagine the prosecutorial
field day, "Well, ladies and gentleman of the jury, if Mr. Justice System over there is so
convinced his client is innocent how come he's not doing his usual, 'From the bottom of my
heart, it was a man in Borneo who did this and not my DNA-matching client!'?" (See supra
note 46, and Dana Carvey for insight on the Borneo issue).
54. Physical disengagement is best described as follows: Lawyer to potential client,
"There is no way on God's green earth I'd ever represent you, even if there are movie rights
involved."
55. If A means B and B means C, then A mean C unless A has a really good defense
lawyer and a man in Borneo on stand-by.
56. Or maybe just a reference or two to the importance of the proper use of recycling
bins or even just a tip of the hat to moral values.
57. For example, under Rule 1.6(a) "A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to
representation of a client unless the client consents after consultation . . . ." ABA MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1995). Thus the lawyer may have relevant and
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to lawyers thus becomes compliance with a set of rules based on
the justice system's efficient functioning as opposed to notions of
fair play, balance, or utilitarianism. 59
The result is that in those cases in which physical disengagement
is not an option, the lawyer never may face directly the question of
the consequences of his representation of a guilty client to the
good of the whole. The ethics rules of the profession mandate
representation over conscience. "And therein lies the
rub"60--dismissing one's conscience is a dangerous activity.61
material information that cannot be disclosed. There are exceptions to this "lips are sealed"
rule, such as if a client reveals he intends to blow up a federal building or the client is a
Kennedy headed to Florida for spring break. Criminal conduct surely lies ahead and Rule
1.6(b) allows the lawyer to contact the FBI in the first instance and Florida officials in the
second so that they can post border notices and signs around college campuses: "Caution:
Kennedy in State."
58. Actually, the use of the phrase "efficient functioning of the justice system" is itself
a rationalization and form of moral disengagement. The rules of ethics provide the
parameters for a lawyer's behavior when a client has decided not to admit, plead, settle, or
generally throw himself or herself on the mercy of the court. The most efficient functioning
of the justice system would occur if those who are guilty or liable just 'fessed up. Hence,
even the rules themselves are salve for the morally disengaged in that the noble cause of
justice is served even in Kirkland/Pacino circumstances. See supra notes 1-2.
59. Utilitarianism is yet another hifalutin term that focuses ethical choices on good of
the whole. What's best for society or all involved in a given situation? When a client
confesses to a lawyer, it would be best and cheapest all around for society if the lawyer or
the client communicated that guilt and appropriate punishment, damages, and outcry
followed immediately. Judge Judy functions this way, along with doses of humiliation. But,
the lawyer's code of ethics holds the communication rights inviolate and allows the
confession concealed even if it means that the guilty go free, thus leaving the lawyer with
the knowledge of guilt, which can become unbearable particularly if the guilty, free-to-roam
client strikes again. The value of honest communication between lawyer and client is
deemed a higher value than truth for the burden of proof lies with the opposing side not
one's client. Logistically, it's not a bad system. But, it does require moral disengagement for
the system to work. Lawyers' rules represent a unique ethical standard: check your personal
ethics and start your representation engines. Imagine an architect being forced to conceal a
client's use of substandard materials. Imagine a doctor concealing eboli virus in the interest
of a patient's demand for privacy. The client/patient's interests are subordinated to the
interest of non-collapsing buildings and plague prevention. However, the legal system
mandates lawyers' mollycoddling of murderers (and some lawyers take their mollycoddling
very seriously-see Carmen Fischer's conjugal visits with her client supra note 15).
60. Hamlet said this in HAMLET,AcT I, SCENE 1.. It's an archaic, Shakespearean phrase
for, "Here's the deal right here."
61. In the movie The Godfather (Paramount Pictures 1972), this dismissal of
conscience reaches a fever pitch. Johnny Fontaine (Vic Damon) desires a Hollywood career
even as he is a two-bit singer. Don Corleone, his godfather (who happens to be Marlon
Brando), learns that a director has denied Fontaine a part. Corleone/Brando assures him it
can be handled. Don Corleone sends Tom Hagen (Robert Duval/Boo Radley, see supra note
52) to negotiate with the now-famous "offer he can't refuse," which turns out to be the head
of his horse in bed with him one morning. Needless to say, Fontaine gets the part. The
author searched in vain for a horse head-in-the-bed DR, but found nothing. Rule 3.5 on
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In most other ethical maxims and models, the impact of one's
conduct is either the motivation or rationalization for behavior, but
for lawyers, the impact and motivation are irrelevant because the
code is beholden to a system, not a set of values.62 Moreover,
morality is further distanced when lawyers realize that representing
a guilty party because you need the money is thus no different
from representing a guilty party because you believe the law to be
63
unjust. You get money for representing both the just and unjust.
The profession's or system's ethics make you noble in both
circumstances, but in the former your representation is for dollars
earned at what is personally perceived or analyzed to be at
expense of the whole. 64 The code of ethics thus becomes a
justification or rationalization for conduct a lawyer might find
personally morally offensive. 65 The only question a lawyer is
decorum is limited to court.
David Laban phrases the moral slope problem as follows:
If you think winning is the most important thing, you will eventually think winning is the
only thing. Take the normative content out of the lawyer's role and the lawyer will feel
impelled to take the normative content out of law as well and define it... as victor's spoils
pure and simple. David Laban, The LysistratianPrerogative:A Response to Stephen Pepper,
1986 AM. BAR FOUND. RESEARCH J. 637, 648 (1986). Translation: Take the rules of morals out
of lawyering and lawyers will take them out of life. The author disclaims all liability should
readers try to say aloud the word "Lysistratian."
62. It's a great deal like being a teenager. You do certain things because the system
values and sanctions it, not because you really believe what you are doing to be a good
thing. How else can the backward baseball caps be explained? The visor intended to shield
one's eyes is placed conveniently over the spinal cord and the entire look brings the names
Goober and Gomer to mind, but the system has sanctioned the activity. So it is with lawyers.
The futility of justifying conduct sanctioned under the code of ethics is akin to explaining a
backwards baseball cap. Richard Wasserstrom notes that if a lawyer does not believe a
client, he is simply playing a role as in a play, however, the audience (i.e., judge and jury)
don't know that he is playacting. Wasserstrom, supra note 38, at 5.
63. Lawyers represent folks at all levels of Kohlbergain development: preconventional
(shoplifters go to jail); conventional (most folks don't care for shoplifters); and
postconventional (you'll be arrested at a sit-in if you protest shoplifting laws and their
discrininatory impact). The most money is made in representing the preconventional for the
altruistic anti-shoplifters rarely have resources, unless, of course, they engage in
shoplifting-a vicious circle of reasoning is emerging. LAWRENCE KOHLBERG, ESSAYS ON MORAL
DEvELOPMENT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF MORAL DEvELOPMENT 30-31 (1981).

64. "[Tlhe lawyer as professional comes to inhabit a simplified universe which is
strikingly amoral-which regards as morally irrelevant any number of factors which
nonprofessional citizens might take to be important, if not decisive, in their everyday lives."
Wasserstrom, supra note 39 at 8.
65. Even lawyers themselves have not bought into the system completely. One can
represent Richard Speck, Ted Kaczynski, and Jack Kevorkian and feel really good about it,
but take on the defense of GM and you've crossed into the vast moral wasteland. In 1970,
Professor Monroe H. Freedman and Professor Michael Tigar (no relation to Pooh bear) had
what was apparently a nasty exchange (the author concludes so because in Monroe H.
Freedman, The Lawyer's Moral Obligation of Justification, 74 TEx L REv. 111 (1995),
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required to evaluate under moral neutrality or moral right of
66
representation is whether an individual needs representation.
Questions that need not be examined, but are impossible to ignore
from a moral, as opposed to a code, perspective include: What is
this client's reputation for veracity? What is this client's purpose?
What is my purpose in representation? Are other non-clients denied
their rights if this client's case proceeds? 67 The personal values,
demons, and goals of the client may be ignored while the lawyer
also disregards societal interests and/or the rights of others
involved. 68 How long can lawyers engage in limited moral
Professor Freedman apologizes for angering Professor Tigar, at 115) over the propriety of
Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering agreeing to defend General Motors in an air pollution case. Law
students, led by Ralph Nader (a lawyer himself, and, certainly no friend of GM's (see, e.g.,
RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1970), which is Nader's indictment of the Corvair, not for
its design that made it look like a bee in mating season, but for its explosive tendencies)
picketed outside of Wimer, Cutler & Pickering's offices in Washington, D.C. Tigar agreed
with the picketers and Nader,
I am not criticizing [Winer, Cutler & Pickering] for [going all out on behalf of their
clients]. I am criticizing them for their choice of their clients that they choose to go all out
on behalf of. And that, you see, is an important difference... you have to make a decision
the decision is whether or not you will commit your skills, your talents, your resources to
the vindication of the interests of the vast majority of Americans or the vindication of the
interests of . . . the minority of Americans who own the instruments of pollution and
repression. 74 TEx L REV. at 112-113.
If GM is a defendant, does not the law entitle them to a defense? Does not the system
mandate representation? If you cut them, do they not bleed? Okay, only brake lines in
vehicles bleed, but, doggone it, GM is entitled to a lawyer. See supra note 63.
So also are tobacco companies, but Judge Kenneth Starr enjoyed the disdain of the bar for
his representation of a client that happened to be a tobacco firm. See, e.g. ALAN M.
DERSHOWrrZ, SEXuAL McCARTYISM, at 95 (1998).
66. A view Professor Freedman held from 1970 until 1995, when he apologized to
Professor Tigar (see supra note 65) because he found a defendant he wouldn't represent:
John Demjanjuk, a Nazi concentration camp guard who came to the United States and
became a naturalized citizen. When his background was discovered, he was extradited to
Israel, acquitted, and then returned to the United States. Professor Freedman then learned
that Demjanjuk was represented by Professor Tigar, to which Professor Freedman said
Mike Tigar, is John Demjanjuk the kind of client to whom you want to dedicate your
training, your knowledge, and your extraordinary skills as a lawyer? Did you go to law
school to help a client who has committed mass murder of other human beings with
poisonous gases? Of course, someone should, and will, represent him. But, why you, old
friend? 74 TEx L REv. at 115.
67. In short, the great Tigar/Freedman match-up (which sounds oddly like something
Don King would promote) raises a whole host of issues that Freedman refused to address
until his own ox was gored and his own gall meter went off. In fact, these legal ethics types
when they do fall, tend to do so in a big way. Professor Freedman not only questioned
Tigar's representation of Demjanjuk, he actually called Demjanjuk a "son of a bitch" in a law
review article. The worst offense was that he had no footnote source for the name calling,
such as, see e.g., Lenny Bruce, Howard Stern, or George Carlin. Bluebook violation trumps
bad language. For the actual SOB reference, see Id. at 114.
68. And so, we see, moral disengagement. What I said 56 footnotes ago. Even a moral
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evaluation? Only until their ox is gored. 69 In short, lawyers snap.
For example, in the film The Star Chamber,70 a defense lawyer
represents two producers of kiddie porn films who stand accused
of the murder of a nine-year-old boy. The child's bloody tennis shoe
was in their van when police officers stopped the van because it
looked suspicious and there was an outstanding ticket that showed
up when the officers ran a check. During the stop, the men offered
proof the fine was paid but the officers,7 pretending to smell
marijuana, searched the van and found the shoe. 72 The search of
the van represents a classic Fourth Amendment issue.7 3 The role of
the amoral agent is to see that police officers comply with the
constitutional limitations on search and seizure. Fourth Amendment
rights and the search-and-seizure issues are part of the judicial
system, and the role of the advocate or a moral technician is to
keep that system inviolate. That there is a noble system, cause, and
issue does not dismiss the personal moral issues that remain: (1)
Does the exclusion of this evidence free two murderers? (2) How
are the boys' parents affected? (3) What impact will the exclusion
have on future searches and rights? (4) How do the rights of the
boy compare to the rights of privacy protected under the Fourth
74

Amendment?

technician is forced into a position of discounting personal convictions and concerns.
69. See supra note 52. Idioms aside, we don't engage morally except when we see the
issue and client from the victim's side. A restaurant with a uranium mine theme (see supra
note 24) sounds perfectly defensible until the lawyer learns his Uncle Milt was taken by the
scheme. Prior to Uncle Milt's involvement, the lawyer would go to the mat for the uranium
restauranteurs/entrepreneurs. Following disclosure of the gigantic restaurant fraud, the
lawyer seeks the death penalty for securities fraud.
70. THE STAR CHAMBER (Twentieth Century Fox Pictures 1983).
71. Clearly, these officers have not watched enough Cops (Fox Television).
72. In classic Hollywood style, the police officers are depicted as boorish, jack-booted
imbeciles who harass the polite child molesters/killers. It is a well-known fact that child
molesters/killers are more polite and brighter than LAPD's finest. (The author speaks in
sarcasms ... there is no cite here).
73. In The Star Chamber, Michael Douglas plays a judge who snaps. Snapping lawyers
and judges is a common theme in lawyer movies. Once again, Hollywood, in its own
innocent (?) way is indicting moral disengagement. The author does not claim Hollywood
calls it that or understands moral disengagement, but it certainly understands that snapping
lawyers and judges mean big box office. Douglas joins a secret judicial society that metes
out its own punishments to those the judicial system sets free. It is arguable after viewing
this film that enough moral neutrality and moral right of representation rationalizations can
cause impairment of judgment or judges.
74. Under traditional ethical analysis, all of these issues would be examined and the
balancing of individual rights versus societal harm would probably produce the result that
the child killers' trial should include the van/tennis shoe evidence. Michael Douglas excluded
the evidence, the killers went free, and Douglas snapped. He became a member of The Star
Chamber, a group that bumped off the truly guilty who slipped through Fourth Amendment
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The defense lawyer who participated in the omnibus hearing for
this murder case preserved client confidentiality and represented
his clients zealously within the bounds of the law, all while
honoring the standards of his profession. Yet, the result of the
lawyer's work is that two murderers are returned to society. While
defendants generally appreciate this result and end and the lawyer's
practice grows from such victories, the justice and fairness of the
results are troubling. 75
For those who prefer the invisible hand theory as opposed to the
amoral technician theory, there are times when justice is so blind
that facts are lost. In other words, the invisible hand
malfunctions. 76 In Witness for the Prosecution,77 a barrister
discovers after he has won an acquittal that his client is indeed
guilty. Sir Wlford, the barrister with the guilty client, violated no
rules, but the witness7 s who won his client an acquittal lied on her
loopholes. Alan Dershowitz was not in the film.
75. Indeed, Michael Douglas is forced to look at pictures of the young boy shown by
the boy's father. The boy's father, a physician, can no longer work because he is consumed
with grief and is forced to sell the family house and move because the boy's mother can't
bear to see her son's room and constantly heard him crying. Hollywood does do a darn good
job of making.moral disengagement darn hard to do. This from a city that brought us Sharon
Stone and Striptease (Castle Rock Entertainment, Lobell/Bergman Productions 1996).
76. Which cuts way back on the charm and comfort of the invisible hand theory of
justice. That it doesn't always work that way deprives lawyers of yet another source of
comfort in moral disengagement.
77. WrrsNss FOR THE PROSECUTON (United Artists 1957). You can't go wrong with
Marlene Dietrich and Tyrone Power in a 1957 Billy Wilder film version of an Agatha Christie
play just chock full of barristers and solicitors. Charles Laughton plays Sir Wilford, the
defense lawyer, who is also a convalescing heart patient described by his nurse as "not
discharged, but expelled from the hospital for conduct unbecoming a cardiac patient." As Sir
Wilford, Laughton is depressed after his discharge because of being sentenced to a "diet of
bland civil suits" until Tyrone Power enters as a defendant charged with murder. This was
Tyrone powers last movie before a fatal heart attack at age 45. The shot of one of Marlene
Dietrich's famous legs cost $90,000 in extras and stunt men. The Royal Family was given a
sneak preview of the film but was required to take a pledge to not reveal its ending. Sir
Wilford describes his client as a "drowning man clutching a razor blade," and "a man with
one foot on the gallows and another on a banana peel." Sir Wilford's blood pressure was 240/
130 on the day of the trial. But he did take his Thermos of "cocoa" into trial.
78. The witness is the defendant's wife. This movie has more twists and turns than
Disney's Space Mountain. It's a must-see for any lawyer ever duped by a witness. Indeed,
House Manager Ed Bryant said he felt like Charles Laughton after he deposed Monica
Lewinsky. Nicole Seligmann, one of the President's lawyers (although not one of the
president's men), said Mr. Bryant was more like Javert, the irrepressable officer in Les
Miserables. "Laughton might be the more fitting reference. It is that of the dogged, tireless,
obsessed Inspector Javert once played by Mr. Laughton in the 1935 movie version of Les
Miserables." 145 CONG. REc. § 1290, at 1310 (Feb. 6 1999). Defense lawyers always resort to
Javert when they are losing. If all else fails, call it relentless prosecution. Victor Hugo was a
defense lawyer at heart.
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own without Sir Wilford's knowledge. Sir Wilford is troubled by
what the system, in which he was complicit a agent, has done. He
is then left with the possibility of breaching a client confidence in
an after-the-acquittal ethical dilemma. 79
More important, perhaps, he is left with the knowledge that his
efforts produced, at best, a miscarriage of justice.80
The questions presented in these two films are (1) whether one
gives greater deference to the Bill of Rights or to one's personal
convictions; and (2) whether one must suppress the truth for a
client. The lawyer's code provides that the Bill of Rights and client
confidences are higher sources of law to which the lawyer must
defer, which may contradict the lawyer's personal code of ethics
and induce the fear of another child murdered as a murderer goes
free. 81 To avoid discipline and/or malpractice the lawyer must defer
to the rules of the profession as the higher law. Such deference,
which means suppression of the obvious but unaddressed moral
issues beyond professional responsibility, means that the personal
moral codes of ethics decline or disappear. There are consequences
when deference is exercised and personal values ignored.
Suppressed personal values are never a pretty sight.82
79. It is one thing to knowingly defend a guilty party and quite another to defend a
client one believes to be innocent but who turns out to be guilty, not only of murder, but
murder for money. Tlyrone Power, the client, killed an elderly woman after ingratiating
himself to her enough to be named in the will.
Furthermore, Sir Wilford is left with the knowledge that he unwittingly perpetrated a fraud
on the court because he produced and had admitted the falsified evidence. Now there Sir
Wilford has a problem. Comment 11 to Rule 3.3, ominously titled, "Remedial Measures"
provides as follows:
if perjured testimony or false evidence has been offered, the advocate's proper course
ordinarily is to remonstrate with the client confidentially. If that fails, the advocate should
seek to withdraw if that will remedy the situation. If withdrawal will not remedy the
situation or is impossible, the advocate should make disclosure to the court. MODEL CODE OF
PROFEssIoNAL RESPONsILxrr Rule 3.3 cmt (1995)
80. Sir Wilford takes no pleasure in an acquittal for a guilty client, especially when the
acquittal is based on false evidence. Sir Wilford permits the true ethical issues to surface for
he prides himself on being a technician who can outwit with facts and law, but not an
amoral one. Indeed, he tells his client upon discovering the fraud, "My dear, couldn't you
have worked with me truthfully and honorably? We could have won." WrrNESS FOR THE
PROSECUTION (United Artists 1957).
81. To which lawyers often find themselves saying, "Who decided this? I don't
remember voting."
82. Philosopher Mary Midgley notes that psychological difficulties spring from
client-centered values for such an approach:
is understandable as a piece of crisis-management for particular cases-for abnormal
dependence, abnormal submissiveness and conformity. Or again, it can be seen as a
half-truth of value for all of us. Self-respect, self-understanding, and indeed self-love, are
necessary parts of serious living, they are not guilty excesses; we vitally need them .... But
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III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF DEFERENCE TO RULES

The consequences of deference to legal and rights-based ethics
as opposed to a moral philosophy foundation are numerous
because of the notion of moral hazard.83 As difficult as it is to say,
lawyers acting in their professional capacity and abiding by
professional rules truly are a moral hazard, meaning that they
maximize their own benefits while not having to bear the societal
consequences of such maximization.8s Because the code of
professional responsibility permits disregard for the consequences,
the lawyer can disengage from personal moral standards. Once a
lawyer has made the decision to disengage, conduct is controlled
exclusively by the standards of the profession because personal
values are by necessity divorced from professional evaluation. In
addition, once personal' values are divorced, there are
consequences summarized in the following categories: (1) truth
becomes a victim of the profession rather than the goal of the
justice system; (2) both individual and professional credibility
suffer; (3) there is an inability to draw moral lines, for so much
conduct is rationalized under the rules that the process of
rationalization continues; and (4) injustices results.8
A. Truth As a Victim of the Profession'sRules
Lawyers are true postmodernist zealots.86 Once they buy into
zealous representation,87 all manner of skullduggery occurs because
it is surely alarming to preach this gospel as normal and comprehensive advice for most
people.MARY MIDGLEY, CAN'T WE MAKE MORAL JUDGEMENTS? 121 (1991).
83. Larry Flynt and Charlie Sheen sound like moral hazards, but the term actually has
its origins in economics.
84. Moral hazard is formally defined as follows:
Moral hazard may be defined as actions of economic agents in maximizing their own
utility to the detriment of others in situations where they do not bear the full consequences,
or equivalently, do not enjoy the full benefits of their actions due to uncertainty and
incomplete or restricted contracts which prevent the assignment of full damages (benefits)
to the agent responsible. JOHN EATWEL. MURRAY MILGATE, AND PETER NEWAN, THE NEW
PALGRAvE: A DIcIoNARY OF ECONOMICS (1987).
In short, lawyers can use their knowledge to benefit themselves and their clients without
regard to the consequences to society, which, many have noted, doesn't sound too much
different from Exxon. Perhaps, therein lies the rub: the commercialization of the profession.
85. It's not Old Testament destruction, but it can be a mess.
86. When the author explained this theory of the article, i.e., lawyers as postmodernist
zealots, one colleague said, "I didn't know you could get certified in that." Yes, the new
post-modernist zealots section of the American Bar Association, you can pay dues if moved
to do so.
87. Canon 7 of the ABA Mode Code of Professional Responsibility provides: "A lawyer
should represent a client zealously with the bounds of the law." Rule 1.3 of the ABA Model
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professional
skullduggery
is distinguishable
from generic
skullduggery, largely owing to the fact that lawyering rules
authorize skullduggery in the name of noble virtues, such as client
privilege, the preservation of the adversary system, and John
Grisham novels and flicks.88
In true moral hazard fashion, skullduggery occurs in the use of
procedure to suppress the truth or keep the truth from emerging.
For example, consider the client who has run a red light and
received a ticket. The client confesses that indeed she did run a
red light. Her lawyer tells her to take the ticket to a hearing
anyway because there's a good chance the police officer will not
show up for the hearing.89 When the officer does not show up for
the hearing, the client is relieved of all responsibility, the case is
dismissed, and the lawyer is hailed a hero.90
Another procedural tool that can divert or postpone truth is
dilatory tactics. For example, suppose that you knew your client,
the president of the United States, had a history of sexual affairs 91
and a young woman has brought a sexual harassment suit against
the president. It's fairly clear that your client did harass the young
woman 92 but your client has another election pending and needs
time. You take a motion to dismiss all the way to the United States
Rules of Professional Conduct provides that "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence
and promptness in representing a client." Canons, ECS and DRS are part of the Model Code
and Rules and comments are part of the Model Rules. The states are all over the map, so to
speak, on what they have adopted. New York, Ohio, and California have even developed
their own systems of rules.
88. Truly, were it not for skullduggery we wouldn't have A Time to Kill (Warner
Brothers, Regency Enterprises 1996), The Firm (Paramount Pictures 1993), The Client
(Warner Brothers, Alcor Films, Regency Enterprises 1994), or The Rainmaker (Constellation
Films, Douglas Reuther Productions, American Zoetrope 1997). There's Tom Cruise in a
Memphis firm that does off-shore tax planning for the mob. There's no Rainmaker without
skullduggery on the part of insurance defense lawyers, and The Client is just not suspenseful
without Romey, the lawyer, for the mob, and the mob is, by judicial notice and common
knowledge, skullduggery writ large.
89. For the advice, the lawyer is paid. There is no available defense, there is only a
procedural hope.
90. Punishment avoided, guilt irrelevant, and more new red lights clients than the
lawyer can handle. Is this a great ethics system or what?
91. At this point in the nation's history, the author is unclear on the definitions of
"affair," "relationship," "sexual relations," and "is" but would like to clarify that she refers to
whatever it is called when two folks have conduct while at least one of them is partially
unclothed, although not necessarily aroused. See, e.g., Judge Susan Webber Wright's
definition list in Jones v. Clinton reprinted in ALAN DERSHOwirz, SExuAL MccARTHYIsM, at 18-19.
92. Even American Lawyer has come out and said Mrs. Jones' case was strong. Stuart
Taylor, Her Case Against Clinton, AmER. LAWYER, Nov. 1996, 57. For Supreme Court ruling
and background, see Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
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Supreme Court where the justices slain dunk you nine-to-zero on a
privilege for the president. You knew that the justices would rule
that way, you know your client is guilty, but you went to the
Supreme Court for a delay. Under the rules, you're fine.9 3 In your
soul, you've delayed, cost the plaintiff a lot of money, and
obfuscated.9 4
In yet another situation where the lawyer knows the truth, the
rules justify silence on the part of counsel in the face of false
testimony.
An evidentiary example debated by legal ethics experts follows:
A lawyer represents a plaintiff in a negligence action involving
a man who was killed when he used a defective elevator. A
crucial issue is whether the defendant was on notice of the
defective condition. The most important witness on that issue
is the defendant's former janitor, now retired.
93. In the comments to Rule 1.3 there is the notion that a proceeding is not frivolous
"even though the lawyer believes that the client's position ultimately will not prevail." Thus,
you could not only try presidential privilege but, Secret Service privilege, separation of
powers privilege and Socks-the-Cat privilege.
94. But, hey, that's good lawyering. Also, the author confesses a fondness for
obfuscation. Interestingly, the system of justice needs protection only when the Fourth
Amendment right to privacy is at issue or when the prosecution fails to make a case. The
justice system apparently can survive dilatory tactics. However, in fairness to the profession
it should be noted that Professor Dershowitz feels Robert Bennett, said president's lawyer,
did an awful job. See, e.g., ALAN DERSHOWITZ, SEXUAL McCA nrnsM at 12-25.
See also e.g., the following procedural summary of the case: Jones v. Clinton, 974 F Supp.
712, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEs 12942, 74 Fair Empl. Prac. Case. (BNA) 1381 (E.D. Ark. 1997); Stay
granted, in part, motion denied, in part, Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 696 (E.D.
Ark. Jan. 29, 1998); motion granted, Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LExis 926, 26 Media L
Rep. (BNA) 1979 (E.D. Ark. 1998); motion denied, Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LxIuS 1365
(E.D. Ark. Feb. 10, 1998); reconsid. denied, motion denied, request denied, Jones v. Clinton,
993 F. Supp. 1217, 1998 U.S. Dist. LExIS 2923, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 430 49 Fed. R.
Evid. Serv. (Callaghan) 432 (E.D. Ark. 1998); summ. judgment granted, dismissed, Jones v.
Clinton, 990 F Supp. 657, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXS 3902, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 589
(E.D. Ark. 1998); appeal dismissed, remanded, Jones v. Clinton, 138 F 3d 758, 1998 U.S.
Dist LExiS 9698, 76 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 928 (8th Cir. Ark. 1998); recons. granted, in
part, mot. granted, Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXS 17347 (E.D. Ark. June 30, 1998);
recons. granted, in part, recons. denied, in part, mot. granted, Jones v. Clinton, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LExls 20886 (E.D. Ark. Sept. 1, 1998); ops. combined at Jones v. Clinton, 12 F Supp. 2d
931 (E.D. Ark. 1998); mot. granted, Jones v. Clinton, 16 F Supp. 2d 1054, 1998 U.S. Dist.
LEXIs 18839, 27 Media L. Rep. (BNA) 1156 (E.D. Ark. 1998); settled, mot. denied, Jones v.
Clinton, 161 F. 3d 528, 1998 U.S. App. LExi 33884, 78 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 831 (8th
Cir. Ark. 1998).
On April 12, 1999, Judge Susan Webber Wright held the President of the United States in
contempt. John M. Broder and Neil A. Lewis, Clinton is Found to be in Contempt on Jones
Lawsuit, N.Y. TiMES, April 13, 1999, Al, A20. She slapped the commander-in-chief with a
hefty $1,202.00 fine and Mr. Clinton was required to pay $91,000 of Ms. Jones' lawyers' fees.
Merciless wench.
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On cross-examination, the janitor is asked whether the
plaintiff's lawyer provided the witness with the new suit he is
wearing, and whether the lawyer paid the witness $1,900 to
testify in the case. The witness answers no to each question.
In fact, each of the answers is false.
The lawyer does not suggest that the witness correct his
testimony, nor does he take any other remedial action. On
closing argument, the lawyer argues the witness's testimony as
evidence in the case.
95
Has the lawyer acted ethically?
The answer to the question, according to the Code of
Professional Responsibility and ABA model rules, is that the lawyer
has acted ethically because the lawyer did not solicit false
testimony and the witness is not a witness for the critical question
of liability in the case. 96 However, from a moral perspective, a
witness has lied. Granted, it is not the lawyer who has not been
candid with the court. But, the court has false information. A
morally disengaged analysis would find either that the invisible
hand will work or that, as an agent or advocate, the role is not one
of representing others who choose to commit perjury. From a rules
perspective, lying is permitted because the rules do not require its
revelation. How long can a lawyer's moral compass survive in a
profession in which lies need not be condemned or revealed?97 The
danger of this extent of moral disengagement is that a lie no longer
seems to be a problem. The issue is no longer whether lying is
morally wrong but, rather, when lying is acceptable.
Certainly the moral debate on lying, apart from our code, is by
no means an area of bright lines. Scholars in moral philosophy note
that the prophet Elijah lied to the Syrians 98 to save his people.
Rebekah and Jacob lied to Isaac. 99 Anne Frank's friends lied to
95.

Testimony of Geoffrey Hazard in People v. Friedman, as reported in MONROE

FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAwYERs' ETHIcs 128 (1990).

96. But for very different reasons; i.e., for the birthright; i.e., the money.
97. Which sounds suspiciously like the beginning of a lawyer joke. Although most
lawyer jokes begin, "A priest, a lawyer and Atia the Hun are together in a life boat .
but seriously.
98. 2 Kings 6:21-22 (for a lying Eijah).
99. See Genesis 27, where Rebekah and Jacob schemed, complete with hairy hands, to
dupe Isaac into giving Jacob, instead of Esau (the firstborn) the birthright. Esau went to
hunt venison and the next thing he knew, the will was invalid. The lying here, however, is
slightly more problematic. They weren't lying to stop a war, as in the case of Elijah, they
were lying to change intestate succession or the probate of a will (all depending upon how
you view birthrights).
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government officials to save her life.' Atticus Finch lied to protect
Boo Radley.10' Moral examination focuses on the lie and the
circumstances. Legal ethics focuses on the client's right to lie and
the lawyer's obligation to protect that lie. Which brings us to Class
Action,'02 a case of lying, disclosure, and obfuscation. Gene
represents product liability plaintiffs and his daughter, Maggie,
represents big-time corporate defendants. She finds out her client is
guilty as sin and even has a memo to prove it. Her boyfriend/senior
partner is the man who truly bungled the product manufacture
approval years earlier and she faces a classic triangle: my father as
my opponent; my boyfriend as a sleaze; and Rule 11 mandatory
disclosure breathing down my neck.
To disclose or not to disclose, therein lies the question. 1°3 And
how does a lawyer's nondisclosure here differ from the
nondisclosure of a client's absolute confession of guilt? Moral
disengagement becomes more challenging with each movie.
Suppose, in yet another truth versus fiction situation, that a real
estate lawyer has closed a real estate deal 1°4 and then learns that
her client induced the deal by fraud. The lawyer still has some
post-closing matters and wonders what her ethical obligations are.
Professor Shaffer analyzes the ethical obligations as follows:
Under the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, the
answer is governed by DR-7-102(B)(1) and DR 4-101. When a
lawyer "receives information clearly establishing that . . .[h]is
client has ... perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal,"
the lawyer is required by DR 7-102(B(1) to "promptly call upon
his client to rectify the [fraud]." Further, if the client does not
do that, the lawyer "shall reveal the fraud to the affected
person or tribunal." DR 4-101(A) does protect the
confidentiality of all information gained in the professional
ANNE FRANK, THE DIARY OF ANNE FRANK (1986).
101. I.e., Gregory Peck lied to protect Robert Duval, see supra note 50. Boo was
apparently frightened of what hero status would do to him. The irony of a person named
"Boo" being frightened and/or shy has not escaped the author.
102. CLAss AcTOON (1991). It's another Gene-Hackman-as-a-lawyer-flick. Gene Hackman
plays Jedediah Tucker Ward (see, the name spells trouble), a plaintiffs lawyer in the habit of
brining class action lawsuits against corporations. His daughter (played by Mary Elizabeth
Mastrontonio-her real life name) represents corporations. The two face off in a classic Rule
11 confrontation of discovery, rules, ethics, and parent/child tension.
103. The author paraphrases Polonious from Shakespeare's Hamlet, Act II, Scene 2
(Mel Gibson, to continue the Hollywood theme).
104. Generally involving land, many dollars, title insurance, and the potential of
Chapter 7 bankruptcy if the lawyer messes anything up.

100.
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relationship, but DR 4-101(C)(2) permits the lawyer to reveal
confidential information when permitted to do so under any
other disciplinary rule. Thus, depending on how you read the
applicable provisions, the Model Code appears either to require
the lawyer to divulge the client's past fraud (DR 7-102(B)(1):
"shall reveal") or to permit the lawyer to do so (DR
4-101)(C)(2): "may reveal"). We now know, however, that the
drafters of the Model Code did not intend either result. DR
7-102(B)(1) was included in the Model Code late in the drafting
process, and its effect on DR 4-101(C) was "not appreciated"
by the drafters. According to a member of the drafting
committee, the apparent effect of DR 7-102(B)(1) was the
result of an "oversight" and a "drafting error." As stated by the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, for
reasons of both tradition and policy it would be "unthinkable"
for a lawyer to disclose a client's fraud in violation of
confidentiality. Accordingly, the ABA clarified DR 7-102(B)(1)
in 1974 by adding an "except" clause. As a result, the lawyer is
required to reveal the client's fraud "except when the
information is protected as a privileged communication." The
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility
then explained that the phrase "privileged communication"
refers to what the Model Code calls "secrets," which include
information that might be embarrassing to the client. As
Hazard has wryly remarked, "fraud is always embarrassing,"
and the addition of the "except" clause to DR 7-102(B)(1)
10 5
therefore "eviscerated the duty to report fraud."
So, the standards of the legal profession boil down to this
compelling thought: perpetrating a fraud is acceptable if such
action saves a client from embarrassment. 0 6 Public embarrassment
10 7
is the greater moral evil according to the rules of our sandbox.
Under the rules, a lawyer who is morally offended by the antics of
105. THoMAs L SHAFFER and ROBERT F. COCKeRAN, JR., LAWYERS, CLIENTS AND MORAL
RESPONSIBM 9 (1994).
106. Will no one stand up and say, "Yes, but some clients just beg for embarrassment,"
or we could settle for a little self-righteousness, "If the client hadn't been such a scallywag in
the first place, this embarrassment would not be an issue." I do not expect a full Arthur
Kirkland turn-around by the lawyer, which would require the lawyer to stand at the title
company and say, "Whatever you do, don't buy this property. It's all a sham, a scheme, a
gigantic fraud. Save yourselves. Go back before it's too late." Should such an outburst occur,
I dare say the title company personnel might voice a regret or two as well.
107. And, let's face it, the truth, when revealed in judicial proceedings, is almost always
embarrassing. See the president, discussed supra notes 91-94.
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a conniving client is left with the conscience baggage of finalizing a
deal that victimizes another.
IV. A PERIODIC MORAL REENGAGEMENT
To minimize the dilemma between code ethics and personal
ethics, attorneys require a periodic reality check beyond the
rules-a form of moral reengagement. The same basic reminders
and ethical tests that business people use to help keep their similar
rationalizations about earnings management, securities fraud, and
antitrust activities in check would be helpful for members of the
profession. 108
Beyond the rules, beyond the code, and, hopefully, beyond the
need for moral disengagement, there are some simple questions
lawyers could pose as they evaluate anything from the decision to
represent a client to duties with regard to witnesses and truth, or
the lack thereof: (1) Have I considered the long-term impact of my
decision on this client, my career and the justice system? (2) Is this
decision balanced? How would I feel if I were opposing counsel?
(3) How would my conduct be reported by an informed and critical
reporter? (4) Would I be comfortable if all members of the

profession followed my standards? (5) Have I counseled my client
about the long-term implications of his decisions? 1°9 These five
questions refocus morality from professional to personal and,
oddly, could serve to reinstate professionalism through personal
reengagement.
In The Verdict,"0 Paul Newman plays a ne'er-do-well lawyer who
108. And I dare say they will all need lawyers should such activities not be placed in
check.
109. The author is paraphrasing the business ethics work of Laura Nash, Ethics
Without the Sermon, 59 Nov./Dec. 1981 HARv. Bus. REV. 19. And look what lawyers can do
when reliance on rules is not their moral imperative. In his earlier days as a California
county prosecutor, Chief Justice Earl Warren and the local public defender developed a
relationship of trust that apparently worked to the considerable advantage of the latter's
innocent clients. According to the public defender.
[Warren] said that anytime I was convinced he was prosecuting an innocent man, I should
tell him so. He would let me look at his files and, if that didn't change my mind, Warren
would not prosecute. He trusted me to be as honest with him as he was with me. Leo
Kratcher, EARL WARREN: A POLITICAL BIOGRAPHY 57 (1967).
110. THE VERDICT (Twentieth Century Fox 1982). Paul Newman in legal ethics difficulty
as a lawyer who has but one case, a drinking problem, and a penchant for solicitation
(definitely a violation of a number of DRs, rules, and standards of decency).. In fact, when
the film begins he is a Boston lawyer who has hit rock bottom. The film opens with
Newman soliciting business at viewings in funeral homes. But, he does have a medical
malpractice case and a chance. As the film develops the story of the now vegetative client
and her family, the inspiration of righting injustice emerges. Newman is reminded of his
reasons for becoming a lawyer, and a David vs. Goliath story unfolds. Jack Warden is an
inspirational private investigator for Newman and us. There are ethical breaches in other
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manages to land a gold mine of a malpractice case. 1 ' When
Newman clinches expert testimony from a fellow physician, he
asks the good doctor why he is testifying. When the doctor
responds, "to do the right thing." Newman seems surprised and the
doctor adds, "Isn't that why you're doing it?" The morality of a
good cause is lost in the too-long-disengaged mind of Newman the
lawyer. Perhaps the real tragedy of disengagement is the inability to
appreciate the truly noble accomplishments an effective lawyer
makes.
Ethics is the moral science of doing less than the law allows and
more than the law requires. Absolute reliance on professional rules
produces an atmosphere and profession in which the minimum
becomes the maximum. Legally appropriate is not always morally
sound. Nor is legally appropriate particularly good for the soul.
Periodic reengagement brings a sense of perspective.
In The Rainmaker,' Jon Voight and the lawyers for the
insurance company take steps to prevent dep6sitions of key
company employees by Matt Damon, the whipper snapper
bad-faith-refusal-to-pay plaintiff's lawyer whose partners are Mickey
Rourke and a quasi-licensed Danny DeVito. The ragtag bunch
eventually brings down the insurer but not without Matt Damon
confronting John Voight with the line, "Do you even remember
when you sold out?"
In another scene in And Justicefor A//, Arthur Kirkland sits with
a friend of his grandfather and reminisces about how his
grandfather had paid for his legal education because, to his
grandfather, being a lawyer was the highest honor and profession
one could achieve. It is the thought of his grandfather's pride that
causes Kirkland's snap and admonition to the jury about his client's
guilt, "If he's allowed to go free, then there's something really
wrong going on here." Within the profession, the process of moral
disengagement is causing something really wrong to occur. We are
a profession of crackerjack minds and endless procedure, but one
could not call us a nice profession. In the movie Harvey,"3
portions of the film including little problems such as turning down an offer without
consulting the client; failure to handle a client's case; and being drunk while handling a
client's case.
111. After a long advertising campaign of passing business cards out at funeral homes
and, on occasion, being tossed out for doing so. See Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct for some thoughts on solicitation.
112. THE RAINMAKER (Constellation Films, Douglas Reuther Productions, American
Zoetrope 1997).
113. HARVEY (Universal International Pictures 1950). Jimmy Stewart gives a stellar
performance as Elwood. Josephine Hull won an Oscar for her role as Vita Louise, Elwood's
sister, who with the help of a morally disengaged judge, seeks to have Elwood and Harvey,
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Harvey's friend, Elwood P Dowd, offered the following advice to a
psychiatrist, "Dr. Chumley, my mother used to say to me, 'In this
world, Elwood . . .you must be oh, so smart or oh, so pleasant.'
For years I was smart. I recommend pleasant. You may quote me."
Just as there are moments of lawyer shame in cinema, there are
moments of power, morality, and even lawyers being nice. Replay
the words of Atticus Finch's closing argument in To Kill a
Mockingbird, witness Tom Cruise's hard-fought victory in A Few
Good Men,11 4 or watch with admiration as Wilford Brimley halts the
leaks from a grand jury proceeding in Absence of Malice.115 There
will come with reengagement a sense of pride in what the
profession can do. However, in these examples, the lawyers were
not only doing what they could do, they were doing what they
should do. 116 In these last memorable cinematic looks at lawyers'
work, morality and code ethics were one and disengagement was
simply not in the cards. And so there is a full circle back to the
origins: avoidiig the schizophrenia of disengagement-those who
do, don't snap, the upside of reengagement. For years we in the
profession have been morally disengaged. I recommend more
reengagement. You may quote me.

the six-foot rabbit, committed.
114. A FEW GOOD MEN (Castle Rock Entertainment, Columbia Pictures Corp. 1992). In
this movie, Tom Cruise, Demi Moore, and Kevin Pollack team up against Kevin Bacon and,
with a frightening cross-exam of Jack Nicholson, win the case. Tom's memorable line,
shouted to the Easy Rider himself, is "Iwant the truth."
115. ABSENCE OF MA11CE (Columbia Pictures Corp. 1981). You can't go wrong with a film
that includes both Paul Newman and Wilford Brimley. Also, Sally Field (we like her too, we
really, really like her) plays an investigative reporter attracted to an old,
but-still-very-much-Butch-Cassidy, Paul Newman. Ms. Field is duped by a government strike
force attorney named Elliott (you see, that's trouble already, Elliott is not a good name for a
strike force attorney) into printing a story on an organized crime family and their crimes.
Field is lured into the trap when Elliott leaves a file on his desk and then leaves the room.
Field rifles the file and does a page one story that implicates Newman (Michael Gallagher) in
a murder of a union boss (Joey Diaz). Newman loses his business and a friend when the
friend tries to clear him by telling Field she was with Newman when the murder was
committed. Determined to get even, Newman lures Field into yet another trap in which she
prints further damaging stories. The stories clear Newman but destroy the careers of Elliot
and the district attorney. Wilford Brimley (James G. Wells as Assistant Attorney General for
the Strike Force) may be at his career best as he fires all of them in a showdown in a
federal district court building with Angeline (the court reporter) present along with threats
of "subpoenies."
116. Such is the stuff of moral reengagement: the word "wrong" creeps into
vocabularies.

